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Seduction in Wonderland:
The Need For a Seller's
Fiduciary Duty Toward
Children
By SIDNEY M. WOLINSKY*
AND
JANET ECONOME**
Picture men in an underground cavedwelling. . from their child-
hood, their legs and necks in chains, so that they stay where they are and
look only in front of them . . . [while] a fire is burning behind
them ....
[D]o you think that such men would have seen anything of them-
selves or of each other except the shadows thrown by the fire on the wall
of the cave opposite to them?
[I]f they were able to talk with one another, do you not think that
they would suppose what they saw to be the real things?1
A child's perception of the world, like that of Plato's cavedweller, is
both unique and limited. Very young children are unable to distinguish fact
from fantasy and really believe that the sun follows them when they go for a
walk, that anything that moves is alive, and that dreams come from the sky.2
As children grow they gradually learn to discriminate in an adult fashion,
but not until adolescence does a child's perception of reality correspond
substantially to that of an adult.
Each year sellers3 of goods, mainly toys, cereals, candy, and snack
foods, produced primary for children, invade the child's fragile "wonder-
* Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. B.A. 1958,
Princeton University; LL.B. 1961, Yale University.
** Member, second year class. We would like to give special thanks to Tim
Manolis, cartoonist.
1. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 256-57 (A. Lindsay trans. 1957).
2. M. PULASKI, UNDERSTANDING PIAGET 38-52 (1971).
3. In this article, "seller" is often used in the collective sense to refer to all those
persons who are responsible for the marketing, advertising, and manufacturing of chil-
dren's products.
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land" to sell their merchandise. Manufacturers spend up to $100 million per
year on television advertising.4 They carefully prepare their campaigns well
in advance by employing a battery of Ph.D. certificated child psychologists
and market researchers to discover which products sell to children and how
to sell them. They then hire skilled advertisers, who capitalize on a child's
inability to distinguish fact from fantasy by depicting the various products in
magic environments where cartoon characters co-exist with human beings
and by creating advertisements that depend for their appeal on color, design,
slogans, and fun. Rarely is the intrinsic merit of the product mentioned.
Sellers then beam the advertisement, the net result of hundreds of years of
higher education, years of planning, and numerous hours of preparation,
through the powerful medium of television into the minds and emotions of
receptive children. The cumulative effect of this expertise creates the child's
reality for the brief thirty seconds that his mind is focused on the television
screen.
5
The market for children's products is lucrative' and ever-expanding.
Remarkably, measures protecting youth from this type of commercial
exploitation have not developed proportionately, although the process de-
scribed above seems a classical example of overreaching. The law has
traditionally afforded extra protection for the rights of children in many
relationships, in recognition of their special vulnerability and nalvet6. To-
day, with the burgeoning market for children's products and the prolifera-
tion of advertisements bombarding children, it is desirable, indeed essential,
for the courts to act to protect children by insuring that sellers take the
additional care necessary to treat children with sensitivity. Adequate protec-
tion for children cannot be afforded by piecemeal adjudication condemning
specific instances of abusive conduct after it has occurred. Rather, a com-
prehensive legal theory delineating the standard of care sellers must exercise
is needed to prevent abuse of children in the marketplace.
It is the thesis of this commentary that courts should recognize that
advertisers and other commercial enterprises that deliberately seek to induce
children to buy or use their products stand in a.fiduciary relationship to such
children or to those who purchase goods on. their behalf. To date, courts
have not explicitly recognized this fiduciary relationship. Yet no situation
4. Paying for Playthings, Counting Commercials & Consumers: AcTION FOR
CHILDREN'S TELEVISION NEWS, at 6, Fall 1976 [hereinafter cited as Paying for
Playthings].
5. Much of the persuasiveness of commercials is visual and is impossible to de-
scribe in words. In order to sense some of the impact of these advertisements on children,
the reader should spend an early Saturday morning in front of the television.
6. Paying for Playthings, supra note 4, at 6. Retail spending in 1975 for toys alone
averaged $4.8 billion.
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could more dramatically require application of the ancient principles inher-
ent in the fiduciary concept: a seller with far superior knowledge, control,
and expertise, reaching out with this power to exploit the less experienced,
less educated, trusting, and impressionable child.
This commentary examines the inequities of the seller-child relation-
ship and the inadequate extrajudicial solutions that groups have recom-
mended in response to this problem. A discussion of the strong public policy
affording special treatment to children in other areas of the law and to other
inequitable relationships suggests the fiduciary doctrine as the necessary and
appropriate legal remedy. After outlining the doctrine, its obligations, and
remedies, this commentary explores the general benefits to be gained and
the specific constitutionally protected interests that would be furthered by
the application of the fiduciary doctrine to the seller-child relationship.
I. The Problem: The Seller and the Child Dealing
in the Marketplace
A. The Child
Because of their inadequate experience and underdeveloped intellect,
and their limited access to knowledge of the design, manufacture, and
capabilities of commercial products, children are especially vulnerable in
the commercial world. A child under twelve years of age has had, at most,
eight years of elementary education, five to seven hours a day, and has spent
an equal if not greater amount of time with undiscriminating eyes fastened
on the television screen.' As much as three-fifths of this viewing time is
consumed by advertisements directed at children.'
The eminent child psychologist Piaget determined that a young child
seems unable to distinguish fact from fantasy.9 This observation is illus-
trated by a child's concept of the origin of the sun and the moon. Only upon
reaching the age of twelve years does the average child attribute the sun's
formation to natural processes in which human or divine agents have no
role.' ° Piaget also observed that until the age of seven, a youngster is totally
egocentric and incapable of manipulating data and experience. He found that
the young child truly believes that when the same amount of water is poured
from a wider to a narrower container, the water increases in quantity. The
7. Elias, How to Win Friends and Influence Kids on Television, HUMAN BE-
HAVIOR, Apr. 1974, at 18 [hereinafter cited as Elias]."
8. Bever, Young Viewers' Troubling Response to TV Ads, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1975, at 109 [hereinafter cited as Bever].
9. See generally H. GINSBURG & S. OPPER, PIAGET's THEORY OF INTELLEC-
TUAL DEVELOPMENT (1969).
10. Id. at 99.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
seven to ten year old begins to understand the difference between fact and
fantasy in the abstract but does not have reasoning skills to differentiate
between the two in concrete terms. Only after reaching the age of twelve is
the average child able to analyze a problem before acting on it."
On a typical Saturday morning a child may see someone just like
himself on television with Dracula in the background devouring the young-
ster's breakfast cereal and claiming that there is "adventure in every bowl."
In the next commercial a tiny doll might be flashed in the foreground of the
television screen so that it looks larger than life. Following this distortion,
the child viewer might be shown live footage of an authentic car race,
complete with the hum of car engines in the background. The scene magi-
cally blends into a living room where children play with their "real" race
car set. Of course, the hum of the engines continues throughout the adver-
tisement. A television viewer under the age of seven simply cannot dis-
criminate between the objective and informational aspects of these various
commercials and the parts that exaggerate the product's characteristics by
illusion. Many children simply believe what they see, or what they think
they see; all of the typical advertisements described above might be termed
misleading from a child's point of view, in that they represent characteristics
of the product that do not exist and do not result from its purchase. In fact,
over ninety percent of the mothers surveyed in a recent study said their
children believed that products advertised on television actually have the
characteristics depicted.' 2 Misleading commercials are also harmful for
seven to ten year old children. At this age they are able to realize theoreti-
cally that something deceptive is occurring in commercials but still cannot
distinguish fantastic from factual claims under apparently real cir-
cumstances. Naturally children become frustrated and angry at their inability
to recognize such deceit. At least one observer has found that children of this
age group, having been disappointed by advertisements, often turn into
"little skeptics," believing that all advertising, and by analogy all adult
society, is deceitful. "This shows him that society allows for institutional
hypocrisy, a fact that violates moral precepts he has been taught as a young
child." 3
Even the small percentage of children who recognize the fantasy ele-
ments in commercials cannot objectively judge the merits of the advertised
product because they have extremely limited access to knowledge about the
product. There is barely enough time in a fleeting thirty-second commercial
to present the product visually and to expound its "fun" qualities. These
11. Id. at 219.
12. Elias, supra note 7, at 20.
13. Bever, supra note 8, at 116.
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market considerations provide disincentives to disclose price, materials,
physical dimensions, operational procedures, or product warnings. On the
other hand, the seller has every incentive to exaggerate falsely the size,
speed, and sturdiness of the product. Product packaging often insures that
the child as well as the parent remain in total ignorance of a product's
characteristics. For example, cereal boxes do not disclose what percentage
of their content is sugar. Similarly, toy packages in the store are usually
sealed, ostensibly to prevent tampering. Because of this concealment, the
innocent child has no way to discover that a sturdy looking launcher on a toy
aircraft carrier is merely a rubber band14 until he has paid twenty dollars and
the seller has made a profit. This limited access to knowledge minimizes a
child's opportunity to make objective consumer judgments. Moreover, chil-
dren are not full participants in society's decision-making process. 5 They
do not have financial power to invest or keep their own wages, they cannot
vote, and they are not organized into interest groups per se; nor do they have
any political clout or power to protect themselves by legislation or consumer
action. 6 There has been a slowly growing recognition of the need to estab-
lish and enforce children's rights, but at present, young children, of neces-
sity, must trust and depend on adult society to insure the protection of these
rights.
B. The Seller
Manufacturers and advertisers of children's products rarely respect the
unique attributes of children unless these attributes aid product sales. With
full knowledge of a child's vulnerability, these sellers utilize their vastly
superior resources, knowledge, and manipulative power to reach out with a
sophisticated advertising message in a deliberate attempt to make a child feel
his world is incomplete without the advertised item. As indicated above, the
manufacturer of children's products uses enormous financial resources to
employ an army of professionals to gauge children's reactions to products
and commercials.'" Children are tested in laboratory conditions to determine
target weaknesses in the child's psyche that can be manipulated for financial
gain: "[T]he tiny guinea pigs then act out how their parents are likely to
react to their request for this product, what 'pitches' they themselves would
14. This practice is illustrated by comparing the commercial for "Flying Aces At-
tack Carrier" by Mattel with the product itself.
15. See Sugarman & Kirp, Rethinking Collective Responsibility for Education, 39
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 166 (1975).
16. See text accompanying notes 80-91 infra.
17. M. HELITZER & C. HEYEL, THE YOUTH MARKET: ITS DIMENSIONS, IN-
FLUENCE, AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOU 142 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HELITZER
& HEYEL].
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use on adults and how playmates would feel about the product.' '18 Because
the potential profit in the children's industry is rising,"9 marketing, advertis-
ing, testing, and manipulative techniques have become more refined. Adver-
tisers now divide children into sub-classes consisting of infants (through age
two), preschoolers (three to four years), primary grades (five to eight years),
and pre-teens (seven to twelve years). The precise characteristics of each
class are identified so that a sales pitch most likely to affect the target age
group can be developed.2" Moreover, after financing the development of
children's products, manufacturers spend over $400 million a year to adver-
tise these products through the influential medium of television.2
Corporate manufacturers and advertising agencies are fully aware of
children's differences in perceptual ability and their difficulty in engaging in
rational analysis.22 They intentionally acquire and use a psychological ad-
vantage over children by designing commercials that blur the line between
fact and fantasy so that children will be persuaded that illusions appearing on
commercials are real. For example, advertisers commonly use accelerated
camera speeds, trick shots such as low camera angles that make the product
look taller than it is, or extreme closeups of the product to make it look
larger. The attributes of products such as toys are often overstated so that
one could assume that they work perfectly every time, when in reality they
frequeritly malfunction. Often commercials are set in fantasy environments,
are animated, and use "heroes"--comic and cartoon characters and pro-
gram personalities, children's trusted friends-to sell the products. In a one
month survey, fifteen percent of all commercials used personality tie-ins,
including characters from "Peanuts," "Star Trek," "the Flintstones," and
"the Waltons. "23 Children do not realize that the creator of Fred Flintstone
is being paid to say that a cereal tastes good, but instead are likely to believe
Fred Flintstone's representations.
The use of premiums (giving away another item with the purchase of
the product) is a favored method used to sidestep selling the product on its
own qualities.24 For example, the child is exhorted to buy a specific cereal
because of a prize hidden in the box. Through the use of premiums and the
18. Elias, supra note 7, at 17.
19. Id. at 22.
20. See HELITZER & HEYEL, supra note 17, at 102-11.
21. W. MELODY, CHILDREN'S TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF ExPLOITA-
TION 89 (1973).
22. See generally Bever, supra note 8.
23. Toys Usurp Ad Time While Public Service Announcements Perish in the Holi-
day Rush, ACTION FOR CHILDREN'S TELEVISION NEWS, Fall 1976, at 5. See also
Action for Children's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 16 (1975); Goldsen, Toys and the Im-
agination of Children, HUMAN BEHAVIOR, Dec. 1976 at 17.
24. See 39 Fed. Reg. 25,505 (1974).
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other techniques mentioned above, the manufacturer and advertiser attempt
to convince the child that the mundane product is a unique commodity that
he and his peers should not live without. How special can a new breakfast
cereal be? Advertisers must of course be allowed to use their ingenuity to
distinguish their product from a competitor's; however, they should be
restrained from the kind of artifice that amounts to misrepresentation when
the young audience is considered.
Sellers have most of the available knowledge about the capability
of, manufacture, and any dangers that characterize a product. The child, or
purchaser of children's products, is in a position to know only what the
seller discloses."5 Moreover, even when occasional disclaimers in the body
of the advertisement qualify misrepresentations (such as the warning that
batteries are not included), they are often ineffective because the disclaimer
is accompanied by music, is spoken so quickly that it is barely discernible,
or is said in a different tone of voice so that it seems unrelated to the
advertisement. In addition, studies show that children do not adequately
comprehend disclaimers unless the vocabulary used is appropriate for
them.2"
The seller's seduction in wonderland is successful. Children do not
have the experience necessary to evaluate the actual information conveyed
by an advertisement and to balance the knowledge against their emotional
response to the slick, persuasive presentation. A recent survey of children in
grades one through five showed that seventy-five percent asked their
mothers to purchase the cereal they saw on television and that eighty percent
requested the toys they saw.2" Because children strongly influence their
parents' buying choices,2" and parents can hardly monitor every commer-
cial, advertisers and marketing consultants calculate their messages accord-
ingly: " 'they pitch these toys to them, complete wit slogans and recogniz-
able advertising, and in the process create an army of surrogate salesmen,
who in turn sell the products to their parents.' "29 Sellers are also aware that
advertising plays an important part in children's socialization process, 30 but
25. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
26. R. Liebert, D. Liebert, Sprafkin & Rubinstein, Effects of Television Commer-
cial Disclaimers on the Product Expectations of Children (1976) (Occasional Paper 76-8
written for Brookdale International Institute).
27. Elias, supra note 7, at 20 (quoting a survey by Charles Atkin of Michigan State
University).
28. Avalon Industries, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1728, 1750 (1973).
29. Gilbar, Babes in (Franchise) Toyland, NEW WEST, Dec. 20, 1976, at 63
(quoting Peggy Charen, president of Action for Children's Television).
30. NATIONAL ADVERTISING DIVISION, COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS
BUREAUS, INC., CHILDREN'S TELEVISION ADERVERTISING GUIDELINES-Preamble
(1975) [hereinafter cited as N.A.D.].
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
advertisements do not often encourage generally accepted positive social
values such as friendship, equality, kindness, honesty, and generosity.31
Rather, children learn that physical appearance and material acquisition are
the keys to personal success. They are led to believe that happiness is tied to
new material possessions. Advertisements are especially unfair to low in-
come parents who frequently feel they must spend more money than they
can afford in order to outfit their children with the "right" clothes and
possessions to make them feel accepted by neighbors and classmates.32
This brief outline illustrates the superior resources, psychological
power, and knowledge that sellers and advertisers of children's products
have in their dealings with children. A problem arises when these commer-
cial dealers abuse this power for profit and without regard for children's best
interests.
II. Society Recognizes and Attempts
to Remedy the Problem
Parents, the advertising industry, and government entities on many
levels have recently recognized the inherent fiduciary relationship between
sellers of children's products and their consumers. Each group has articu-
lated its concern that children be protected against the seller's unfair com-
mercial expertise and has offered its solution to this problem. The proposed
remedies discussed below, however, are diluted either in scope or in force,
and even if enforced concurrently, these solutions would not offer children
adequate protection.
A. Parents and the Public
A group of concerned citizens was the first to launch an organized
attack on the effect of children's advertising, especially when transmitted
through television. Consumer interest groups such as Action for Children's
Television (A.C.T.), have petitioned the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) to eliminate commercials on children's television shows.33
A.C.T. and other such groups can take much credit for having brought the
problem into focus nationally. Because of the slow response and inherent
limitations of the government agencies petitioned,34 however, their greatest
achievement has been to educate the public to the abusive situation. Signifi-
cantly, groups such as A.C.T. appear to be representative of more than their
3 1. Id., at Principle IV.
32. See Elias, supra note 7, at 21 (quoting a pilot study by Daniel Yankelvich,
Inc.).
33. Action for Children's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
34. See text accompanying notes 52-79 infra.
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members' views. When the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
response to A.C.T.'s petition, it received more than a hundred thousand
letters,35 most of which favored the petition. This reaction has been termed
the largest response in the history of broadcast regulation.36
Although recognizing the problem, the public might assume that par-
ents, not the FCC or society, should be solely responsible for safeguarding
their children from the commercial world. Surely, parents do have responsi-
bility to protect their children. Parents should instruct their children to look
both ways before crossing a street, but this does not replace the state's
obligation to protect them further by painting crosswalks and regulating
traffic. In many such situations that are out of the control of parents the state
acts in loco parentis through its police power to regulate for the benefit of
the common health and welfare.
For many reasons, advertisements aimed at children should be regu-
lated, as traffic is. It is a truism that television is a staple of American
children's lives. Given the advertising saturation techniques now employed,
it is virtually impossible for parents to monitor every product promotion
their children see.3" Working parents are especially handicapped in the effort
to censor their children's viewing, and as of March, 1975, over fifty percent
of all women with children in the United States worked outside the home.38
Also, merely limiting a child's exposure to the media has proven to be an
ineffective remedy. Studies have shown that even when children's television
viewing hours were restricted, purchases influenced by television were not
proportionately reduced.39 Inevitably, many of the seller's persuasive adver-
tisements will reach children, even if only through friends, and will rival
parental influence. There is therefore a responsibility to make the messages
that reach children conform to standards set with the children's best interest
in mind. No one would dispute that it is in the interest of the community,
and not only the parents, that children be protected.
B. The Industry
The children's product industry, including both manufacturers and
broadcasters, have recognized that children are a unique audience whose
development is significantly affected by their constant influential compan-
35. 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1974).
36. Elias, supra note 7, at 21.
37. For an analogous discussion regarding parents' inability to supervise their chil-
dren's viewing of films, see Comment, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Gov-
ernmental Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YALE L.J. 141 (1959).
38. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 421 (1976).
39. Elias, supra note 7, at 21.
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ion, the television, and by the characters that populate its world: "Hereto-
fore, parents, school and church have been the primary guiding forces in
shaping values and judgments. However, the amount of time spent with
T.V. today adds it as a fourth major influence. "40
The National Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau, 4'
representing sponsors and advertising agencies, and the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters (N.A.B.)42 have both recognized that their failure to
prevent exploitation of children is likely to lead to governmental interven-
tion. Each group has issued regulatory codes to insure fair business practices
in children's advertising, but consumer advocates have critized these codes
as being "more concerned with public relations" than with effectively re-
stricting advertisers. 43 For example, the N.A.B. Code allows fantasy and
animation in children's advertising if these practices are confined to the first
one-third of the commercial." This rule recognizes that the use of fantasy
can amount to misrepresentation, but it does not really address the problem,
because the child can make a false assumption about a product during the
first one-third of an advertisement as easily as during the remaining time.
More important, the effectiveness of both codes is limited in force as well as
scope because neither group has the power to impose meaningful sanctions.
Enforcement measures of the N.A.B. Code, for example, provide broadcas-
ters with little incentive to comply with its standards. When a violation
occurs, the member can either change the offending practice, resign, or be
dropped as a code subscriber. 5 Of the five hundred commercial television
stations licensed by the N.A.B., only four hundred subscribe to the Code. 6
In addition, forty-three percent of the commercial television stations
licensed by the FCC do not even belong to the N.A.B.4 To date, self-
regulatory measures by industry provide at best only a limited restraint on
advertisers and broadcasters.
Realistically, self-regulation cannot be relied upon unless the subject
40. N.A.D., supra note 30.
41. Id.
42. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, CODE AUTHORITY, ADVER-
TISING GUIDELINES (1976) [hereinafter cited as N.A.B. CODE].
43. Adler, Friedlander, Lesser, Roberston, Rossiter, & Ward, The Effects of Tele-
vision Advertising on Children: An Evaluation of the Literature, Interim Report 16 (Mar.
1976) (written for the National Science Foundation). See generally Note, F.T.C. Guide
Banning T.V. Ads That Entice Children: Soft Decision or Assertive Policy?, 4 CAP. U.L.
REV. 109 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Banning T.V. Ads].
44. N.A.B. CODE, supra note 42, at § (II)(A)(4).
45. Powell, Protection of Children in Broadcast Advertising: The Regulatory
Guidelines of Nine Nations, 26 FED. COM. B.J. 61, 73 (1973).
46. [1976] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 60,687.
47. Id.
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industries believe it is in their own best interest to submit to the regulation. If
there is a possibility that reduced profits will result, business executives are
wary of unnecessary zeal in the public interest because of their obligations to
their employers and stockholders. In such circumstances, the state is obli-
gated to assume the burden of regulation. Only if formulated and enforced
impartially can such rules have the desired effect of protecting impression-
able children.
C. Government's Concern and Obligation
The concern for protecting youth from exploitation for profit is interna-
tional. In response to the commercial abuse of children s tendency to believe
what they are shown or told, other national governments have promulgated
broadcasting codes regulating advertising directed at children.4" The broad-
casting codes of Australia, Cypress, Finland, Great Britain, Hong Kong,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, for example, all state that the
general policy underlying these codes is that advertisers should treat young
children with a special standard of care.49 The wording of these codes
suggests the high standard of care imposed on advertisers. "Limitations and
prohibitions denoted [in the codes] by phrases such as 'utmost care and
discrimination',. .. 'likely to endanger. . . children in particular',.
and 'very great care and judgment' also reflect the special consideration
demanded of broadcasters when their advertising is aimed at children." 5
Broadcast codes alone are not likely to be a solution to the problem in
this country because the scope of such regulations is not broad enough to
protect children from all forms of product and marketing abuse.51 Com-
prehensive, well-drafted, and strictly enforced federal regulations promul-
gated by both the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could
possibly provide an effective solution to the problem, but no comprehensive
regulations are now being comtemplated.
The FCC has been asserted by some to be the proper source of gov-
ernmental regulation to insure sellers' fair treatment of children.52 The FCC
has officially recognized both the special relationship between broadcasters
and young children and the special duty of care these broadcasters owe their
young viewers: "Since children are less able to understand and withstand
advertising appeals than adults, broadcasters should take the special charac-
teristics of the child audience into consideration when determining the ap-
48. Powell, supra note 45.
49. Id. at 63 nn.4-13.
50. Id. at 63.
51. See text accompanying notes 52-79 infra.
52. 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 2-3 (1975).
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propriate level of advertising in programs designed for them." 53 After in-
stigating an inquiry into television programming and advertising practices
aimed at children, the FCC announced its "wait and see" policy. The
commission elected not to exercise its power to regulate advertisements on
television until it had an opportunity to observe and evaluate the effective-
ness of the N.A.B.'s self-regulatory attempt and similar voluntary codes. "4
Only if self-regulation of the industry proves ineffective will the F CC con-
sider issuing strict per se rules.5" Even if the FCC were to abandon this
laissez faire policy and assume an affirmative stance toward protecting
children, the scope of their rules probably could not be broad enough to
solve the problem. The FCC's jurisdiction extends to regulation of the
broadcast airwaves in the public interest.5" Only the FTC has the authority to
regulate advertising in all media and to sanction the party who instigates a
deception.57
The FTC was initially created by Congress to halt unfair methods of
competition. With the adoption of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment 8 the FTC
gained the authority, at least in theory, to protect consumers from unfair
selling and advertising techniques even if the practices did not involve
deception or injury to competition.59 Early FTC decisions concentrated on
protecting consumers from false and misleading claims made about a pro-
duct. In the past five years, however, the FTC has recognized the enormous
impact sophisticated advertising can have on a person's psyche."0 The com-
mission's recent official complaints reflect this concern, as it has challenged
as unfair those practices that allegedly exploit consumers' desires, fears, and
anxieties. A typical example of such a complaint is the suit brought against
I.T.T. Continental Baking Company,6 alleging that Wonder Bread's claims
exploited both children's emotions and parental concern that a child grow up
healthy and strong.
Moreover, the FTC's decisions historically have emphasized that chil-
dren should be especially guarded when involved in the commercial world.
This policy was articulated as early as 1934 in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro. "
The Supreme Court in Keppel affirmed the FTC's prohibition of a candy
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id.
56. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307 (1970).
57. Banning T.V. Ads, supra note 43, at 115.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
59. See F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972).
60. Isaacs, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of FTC Regulation, 1972 Wi.
L. REV. 1097, 1102-05.
61. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973).
62. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
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marketing campaign that encouraged children to purchase candy inferior to
similarly priced goods in hopes that their purchases would contain added
prizes and candy. The court stated that children should not be the target of
such an unscrupulous technique because they were too young and vulnerable
to exercise intelligent judgment in such a transaction.63 This policy is echoed
in later FTC decisions. In In re Wilson Chemical Co. ,64 the respondent used
a system of deceptive and threatening letters to coerce payment for its salve
from both adults and children who had been induced to be salespersons for
this product. In discussing the letters the court stated: "They are strong
letters to send to adults. Their coercive nature is increased when it is consid-
ered that in the majority of cases the recipients of these letters are probably
children.'"6 Again, in In re Ideal Toy Corp. ,66 the Commission stated that
age and lack of experience should be considered when determining whether
an advertisement aimed at the young consumer was exaggerated or untrue in
regard to the intended audience. 7
Although the FTC has recognized both the unfairness that exists in
manipulative psychological advertisements and the special vulnerability of
children in the commercial world, it has never, except in consent decrees,
held a seller to the duty of making children's advertisements fair. In the
I.T.T. decision, the commission avoided the fairness issue by finding that
the claims made by the defendant were false.68 Chairman Lewis Engman,
however, recognized an inherent "fiduciary relation" between sellers and
children, indicating that in the future the commission might impose upon
sellers a special duty of care with regard to children's advertisements:
I am not suggesting here. . . that Section 5 condemns every psy-
chological advertisement directed to children. . . . But the adver-
tiser who chooses a child audience as the target group for his selling
message is subject not only to standards of truthful advertising; he is
. . . also bound to deal in complete fairness with his young view-
ers. . . . [A]dvertising directed to or seen by children which is calcu-
lated to, or in effect does, exploit their known anxieties or capitalize
upon their propensity to confuse reality and fantasy is unfair within the
meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.6"
Although the FTC has indicated it intends to hold the seller to a higher
standard of care to insure fair and non-manipulative advertising aimed at
young consumers, the limited sanctions the FTC can impose will not afford
63. Id. at 309.
64. 64 F.T.C. 168 (1964).
65. Id. at 183.
66. 64 F.T.C. 297 (1964).
67. 64 F.T.C. at 310. See also In re Mattel, Inc., 79 F.T.C. 667 (1971).
68. 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973). See Reiss, Special Problems in Advertising, 31 FoOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 252, 256 (1976).
69. 83 F.T.C. at 942 (Engman, C., dissenting in part).
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children the protection they need. The FTC regulates unfair methods of
competition through individual consent orders or adjudication and by indus-
try guidelines and regulations."0 The paperwork involved in effectuating
these remedies is quite burdensome. Procedural due process requires that an
and nothing can stop the offending party from continuing the challenged
practice until the plaintiff has exhausted or abandoned all avenues of appel-
late review." This case-by-case method affords piecemeal regulation at best
and is time-consuming. 2 The final court of appeals decision in Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC ," was issued five years after the advertisements
in question had been discontinued, and the suit challenging Carters' promo-
tion of its "little liver pills" took sixteen years to complete.7 4 Moreover,
FTC resources are limited,75 and the temptation is powerful for an FTC
attorney simply to accept a consent order under which the offender agrees
only to withdraw the misleading advertisement, after the seller has reaped
the initial profit from it. The precedential value of such administrative
decisions is limited, inasmuch as only the specific acts terminated in each
case will be prohibited in the future. There is no authority to prevent the
sellers from employing other misleading techniques to sell their products to
children. Only broad industry regulations can prohibit misrepresentation in
general and impose meaningful limits on the use of such techniques.
The FTC can issue standards of conduct for an entire industry through
trade regulation rules for the purpose of not only defining but also prevent-
ing unfair practices." There is reason to believe that such regulations will
not be promulgated soon, because formulating these rules is at least as time
consuming as individual litigation.77 The FTC can also provide sellers of
children's products with industry guidelines warning of practices that the
commission may challenge in the future. The FTC generally prefers this
method because the guidelines may be promulgated quickly and compliance
70. E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, J. SCHULZ, 'THE NADER REPORT' ON THE FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION 219 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NADER].
71. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1975).
72. "Individual actions are 'perhaps the least efficient, most expensive, and most
time-consuming way' of achieving regulation." Developments in the Law-Deceptive Ad-
vertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1083 (1967) (quoting Elman, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Administrative Process, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 607, 611 (1962)).
73. 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973).
74. Carter Products, Inc. v. F.T.C., 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 884 (1959). See generally Comfeld, A New Approach to an Old Remedy: Corrective
Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission, 61 IOWA L. REV. 693, 697 (1976).
75. See Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection Orders, 40
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 496, 499 (1972).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975). Sie generally Rhoades, Reducing
Consumer Ignorance: An Approach and Its Effect, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 309 (1975).
77. See NADER, supra note 70, at 217.
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is voluntary, which means that expensive lawsuits can be avoided. Although
it can utilize both of these regulatory options, the commission, when it
rejected the proposed guide on television advertising of premiums to chil-
dren,"8 declared that it does not intend to issue per se rules or industry
guidelines against deceptive practices of advertising directed toward chil-
dren. The commission stated that because of its limited resources and lack of
information about the effect of specific advertising techniques on children, it
would continue to regulate children's advertising strictly on a case-by-case
basis."9
This stance clearly indicates that the commission will respond in li-
mited fashion to specific situations but will not attack the general problem.
Currently, specific regulations do not afford sufficiently broad protection,
and the only existing general regulations provide for voluntary compliance.
As indicated above, a seller will usually comply with those aspects of a
voluntary code that will not impair his profit margin. What is lacking is a
comprehensive remedy in the form of regulations that not only will deter the
seller's misconduct but will state the standard of conduct with which he must
comply.
III. Legal Precedent: Special Protection
Traditionally Afforded to Children
The law should give children special protection against their most
powerful exploiters, the sellers and advertisers of children's products.
American jurisprudence has recognized Rousseau's understanding of the
unique qualities of childhood and has long afforded children a special stan-
dard of care: " '[N]ature wants children to be children before they are
men. . . . Childhood has ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling peculiar to
itself; nothing can be more foolish than to substitute our ways for them.' "80
Courts have assumed a dominant parens patriaes' role in protecting
children, perhaps best illustrated by cases in which this role comes in con-
flict with a child's First Amendment rights. Often, this-interest in the wel-
fare of children supersedes their First Amendment rights, which clearly
would have prevailed if an adult were involved. For example, in Prince v.
78. F.T.C., Statement of Reasons for Rejecting the Proposed Guide on Television
Advertising of Premiums to Children (Mar. 9, 1977).
79. Id. at 18.
80. Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and So-
cial Context, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 38, 45 (1975).
81. "Parens patriae" is defined as: "In the United States, the State, as a
sovereign-referring to the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability
." Black's Law Dictionary 1269 (4th ed. 1968).
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Massachusetts"' a state law prohibiting children from selling merchandise in
a public place was upheld when enforced against a child who was distribut-
ing religious literature with her guardian. In so ruling, the court gave more
weight to society's parens patriae role than to the child's First Amendment
right of freedom of religion. Ginsberg v. New York83 cited Prince with
approval and affirmed the state's function to legislate to protect a child's
nalvet6 by classifying magazines as obscene when sold to minors, although
they would not be so labeled if sold to adults: " 'Without attempting here to
formulate the principles relevant to freedom of expression for children, it
suffices to say that regulations of communication addressed to them need not
conform to the requirements of the First Amendment in the same way as
those applicable to adults.' "84
Specific doctrines and statutory enactments in the substantive areas of
torts and contracts also provide good examples of how children are treated
differently from adults under the law. General tort law does not hold a child
to an adult standard of care but instead requires him to conform to the
standard of a "reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience
under like circumstances."5 Out of this different negligence standard has
grown the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, which requires the occupier of
land to treat trespassing children with a higher degree of care than adults and
which excuses those children from the adult standard: "Because of his
immaturity and want of judgment, the child may be incapable of understand-
ing and appreciating all of the possible dangers which he may encounter in
trespassing, or of making his own intelligent decisions as to the chances he
will take." 86 Like the owner of an "attractive nuisance," the purveyor of a
children's product should be held to a special duty of care corresponding to
the reduced responsibility of the child under the law. This special duty of
care exists even though parents and guardians have the primary duty of
protecting their children, since it is impracticable for parents to exercise
constant vigilence over their children."7 Indeed, many parents would agree
that television itself is an attractive nuisance, requiring them to work con-
stantly to counter the harmful influences of shows and advertisements whose
content they cannot control. It seems likely that parents and guardians find it
easier to restrain their children from trespassing than to monitor their televi-
sion viewing of advertising.
82. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
83. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
84. Id. at 638 n.6 (quoting Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963)).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A, at 14 (1965). Accord, W. PROS-
SER, LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 154-57 (4th ed. 1971).
86. Id. § 59, at 364.
87. Id.
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The justification for treating children differently from adults in the law
of contracts is especially germane to the seller-child relationship because the
goal of this special treatment is to prevent commercial exploitation of chil-
dren by adults."8 In order to afford children this extra protection,contracts
with a child are voidable at the child's option. s9 This rule is broadly applied
by courts, for the law makes no distinction based on the maturity of the child
as long as he or she meets the age requirements." A child's right to void a
contract also prevails over innocent third party purchasers, except when the
child is liable for necessities. 9 Courts thus intervene to protect children in
contract transactions when adults are not so protected. The law should
extend this policy by analogy to protect a child who is exhorted to "make a
contract" by buying a product or service that a worldly adult seller has
created especially for children. As of yet, however, children have not been
found to occupy a special position vis-a-vis the seller of children's products.
IV. A Judicial Solution: The Fiduciary Doctrine
The policy of affording children special protection in their interactions
with adult society is part of a broader jurisprudence. The basic function of
law has been defined as "provid[ing] for the employment of the force of
society to restrain those who infringe the liberty of others."92 Fiduciary
doctrines have long been used to help perform this function. In their discre-
tion, the courts have imposed special requirements on relationships they
deem inequitable because of the potential for exploitation of one of the
parties.
The term "fiduciary" is a nebulous concept. The underlying purpose
of the concept and suitable criteria for its application have eluded satisfac-
tory articulation by the courts. Courts apply the fiduciary doctrine on a
case-by-case basis, 3 with holdings clouded by such vague language as
"trust and confidence reposed by one party in the integrity and fidelity of
another," 4 or "dominion" 9" of one party over the other. Courts have found
fiduciary relationships to include partner, attorney-client, principal-agent,
trustee-beneficiary, landlord-tenant, parent-child, guardian-ward, ances-
88. Bumand v. Irigoyen, 30 Cal. 2d 861, 866, 186 P.2d 417, 420 (1947).
89. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 226, at 8 (3d ed. 1959).
90. Id. § 224, at 3-4.
91. Id. § 33, at 25-6.
92. R. POUND, OUTLINE OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENcE 66 (5th ed. 1943).
93. This method has led some commentators to conclude that there can be no gen-
eral definition of a fiduciary relationship. See Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962
CAMB. L.J. 69, 73.
94. See In re Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 143, 204 P. 583, 588 (1922).
95. Hemenway v. Abbott, 8 Cal. App. 450, 465, 97 P. 190, 196 (1908) (petition
for rehearing).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tor-heir, husband-wife, and executor-legatee relationships among others. 9
One commentator suggests that courts have refrained from particularizing
instances in which a fiduciary relation exists out of apprehension that this
doctrine would be limited to those specific relationships that have already
been judicially recognized.97
An examination of certain common themes discernible in the fiduciary
relationship cases will clarify the purpose of the doctrine so that it can be
applied appropriately to other potentially inequitable relationships.9" There
appear to be three general characteristics of relationships to which fiduciary
doctrines have been applied. One party (hereafter termed "advisor") has (1)
power over the other, more vulnerable party (the "reliant" party), (2) who
is characterized by relative weakness, and (3) the advisor has the discretion
to reach out and knowingly exploit this power for his own financial advan-
tage and the reliant party's corresponding financial loss. When the advisor
does in fact abuse this power in favor of himself, equity will intervene. The
greater the advisor's power to control the reliant party, the more urgent is the
need for the law to insure that this power is used fairly. Hence, the scope of
the advisor's fiduciary duty is to a great extent correlative with the amount
of control he can impose on the reliant party.99 The advisor's power can
consist of one or a* combination of the following factors: superior knowl-
edge, 0' experience, 0' resources, 0 2 control,'03 or psychological power 04
96. Robins v. Hope, 57 Cal. 493, 497 (1881). The list of fiduciary relationships is
extensive, and also includes: stockbrokers, escrow agents, insurance agents, accoun-
tants, and their respective clients, and the physician-patient relationship. United States
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hardinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 596, 463 P.2d 770, 776, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 418, 424 (1969).
97. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 956a, at 793 (5th ed. 1941).
98. In the law of fiduciaries, the terms "fiduciary relation" and "confidential re-
lation" are used interchangeably. In re Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 143, 204 P. 583,
588 (1922); Robins v. Hope, 57 Cal. 493, 497 (1881); Estate of Gelonese, 36 Cal. App.
3d 854, 861-3, 111 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837 (1974). But see Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal.
2d 329, 337-39, 364 P.2d 247, 252-53, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1961). Scholars in the law
of trusts have pointed out technical distinctions between these terms. See G. BOGERT,
TRt)STS & TRUSTEES § 482, at 132-33 (2d ed. 1960). However, they in turn use the
terms interchangeably in their own writings, indicating that both terms in fact refer to the
same relationship. Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 237, 238 (1928). This commentary will also treat the two terms as indis-
tinguishable.
99. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4-5 (1975); Scott,
The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949).
100. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945) (superior
party possessed special knowledge gained in the capacity of corporation director and pres-
ident).
101. Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal. App. 2d 348, 215 P.2d 522 (1950) (advisor was a
chiropractor and family friend). See text accompanying note 108 infra.
102. Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App. 2d 357, 305 P.2d 669 (1956) (attorney who
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over the more vulnerable party. The weakness of the reliant party can
include limited access to knowledge,1"5 limited experience and underde-
veloped intellect,1"' or infirmity because of advanced age. 0 '
These principles are manifest in the statutory laws governing trusts and
corporations and also appear in a variety of relationships not governed by
these laws. The facts of a California case, Szekeres v. Reed,' illustrate
these general principles. In Reed, the existence of a fiduciary relationship
invalidated a gift of land deeded to the advisor by the reliant party. The
primary factor that influenced the court was the recipient's superior knowl-
edge compared with the grantor's vulnerability; the grantor could not read or
write well, and was of limited intelligence. The advisor also had superior
psychological advantage because he was the family chiropractor and a per-
sonal friend and had promised the grantor's dying mother he would care for
her son.
The factor of "reaching out" is best illustrated by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court decision in Broomfield v. Kosow,"'0 in which the court
interposed a fiduciary relation between a lender-builder and a nursing home
operator. There was a personal and business friendship between the two
parties and the lender-builder had full knowledge that the nursing home
operator trusted him completely in all their business transactions. The court
held that the defendant violated his fiduciary obligation when he" 'exerted'
the influence springing from that trust and confidence to obtain personal
advantage at the expense of Romano and his nursing homes." 0
took charge of the plaintiff's patent had both the resources to gain special knowledge of
the patenting process and superior business skills to market the patent).
103. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969) (majority stockholders, because of their pervasive control, were held to be in a
fiduciary relationship with the minority stockholders).
104. Psychological power can be defined as either (1) continuing associations of
confidence, such as lawyers who have advised each other for years (South v. Wishard,
146 Cal. App. 2d 276, 303 P.2d 805 (1956)); (2) family associations, such as husband
and wife (Martin v. Martin, 110 Cal. App. 2d 228 (1952)); or (3) the confidence a client
has in a professional, such as an attorney or physician (Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App.
2d 357, 305 P.2d 669 (1956)).
105. Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. 2d 297, 431 P.2d 245, 61 Cal. Rptr.
661 (1967) (fiduciary relationship held to exist between a widow seeking her husband's
pension and a city that purported to have knowledge and training to determine the
widow's rights, because the widow did not have corresponding knowledge or the means
to obtain it).
106. Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal. App. 2d 348, 215 P.2d 522 (1950).
107. Grider v. Manisera, 11 Cal. App. 2d 355, 53 P.2d 982 (1936) (plaintiff's ad-
vanced age was one of the reasons for imposing the fiduciary obligation).
108. 96 Cal. App. 2d 348, 215 P.2d 522 (1950).
109. 349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965).
110. Id. at 757, 212 N.E.2d at 561.
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In virtually all the relations that courts term "fiduciary," interaction
between the parties involves profitmaking. Hence, it is safe to state that the
primary purpose of the fiduciary doctrine is to protect the reliant party from
being exploited in commercial transactions in which people are normally
involved in arms-length, objective dealings.' 1 ' A similar protective attitude
lies behind the policy of affording children special legal treatment in situa-
tions that could be characterized as inherently unequal: the attractive nui-
sance enticing an impressionable child, or the contracting party taking ad-
vantage of the inexperience of a minor. Logically, then, the courts can and
should extend the fiduciary doctrine to protect children in marketplace deal-
ings where they now lack special legal protection, just as vulnerable adults
are protected in the situations discussed above.
V. Application of the Fiduciary Doctrine
to the Seller-Child Relationship
A. The Obligations
The relationship between a seller and a child meets every characteristic
typically ascribed to the advisor's fiduciary relationship with a reliant party.
Indeed, trusting, undiscriminating children are the classic reliant parties.
Accordingly, it is proper that in appropriate cases manufacturers, market
analysts, advertisers, broadcasting stations, distributors, and retail sellers of
children's products should all be held to stand in a fiduciary relationship to
children or to those who purchase products on their behalf. Such a doctrine
would not entrap the unwary, because sellers do not act accidently. On the
contrary, as described above, they carefully calculate each step of their
product promotion. The duties of this fiduciary relationship should arise
when the seller knowingly designs a product for children's use or consump-
tion and then reaches out to the child and exploits the inequality of their
positions to sell the product. The existing cases that deal with fiduciary
relationships have clearly defined the results of such an application of the
fiduciary concept. A fiduciary duty in this context would include the follow-
ing obligations:
1. To Disclose Fully and Fairly all Facts Material to the Transac-
tion.11 This duty would involve, for example, the disclosure of the size,
speed, materials, motion, function, and price of the product.
11. See Weinrib, supra note 99, at 6.
112. See Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965) (defendant
who did not disclose the true cost of a construction contract, although he was aware of it,
was held to have violated his fiduciary duty). See also Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App.
2d 357, 305 P.2d 669 (1956); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 544, at 593 (2d ed.
1960).
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2. To Research Affirmatively and Make Known any Detrimental Ef-
fects of the Product or Service. "I A seller should disclose, for example, the
role of sugar in causing tooth decay or the fact that breakfast cereals, candy,
and other prepared foods with over fifty percent sugar do not properly fit
into a well-balanced nutritional program.
3. To Represent all Advertisements and all Products in a Manner That
Would Not Be Likely to Mislead a Child of Ordinary Maturity, Outlook,
Imagination, Impressionability, and Trust.' 14 This duty may restrain the
advertiser's use of cartoon characters and program hosts. It may also require
him to make plain, reliable claims that a child can understand, for example,
"this toy launcher is propelled by a rubber band," or "this toy works
perfectly only half the time."
4. To Protect Children From Harm Caused by the Product. The seller
should be held to a standard similar to that of strict products liability for
harm that his product may cause children.
B. The Remedies
If the seller were to conduct business under the standards of this
fiduciary relation, children would be adequately protected in their position
as recipients of the seller's promotional material, yet sellers would be left
free to market and advertise their products. Because most sellers will proba-
bly not fulfill these duties voluntarily, legal remedies must provide them
with the incentive to comply. Since breach of fiduciary duty can amount to a
tort,115 remedies available in tort law, including compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctions, and restitution," 6 are all possible tools for the court to
use in proper circumstances. The dual aims of tort law which are, broadly
speaking, to compensate for injuries suffered"' and to prevent the occurr-
ence of harm,' underlie the remedies proposed below. To achieve the latter
113. "When confidence is reposed and accepted, the person trusted is liable for
concealing facts which by reason of the relationship he should disclose." Reed v. A.E.
Little Co., 256 Mass. 442, 449, 152 N.E. 918, 920-21 (1926) (contract to assign a patent
right between an inventor and a corporation).
114. The duty to deal in complete fairness was best articulated by Chief Judge Car-
dozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928): "Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."
115. Pepitone v. Russo, 64 Cal. App. 3d 685, 134 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1976). Accord,
D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 10.4, at 684 (1973).
116. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2 (4th ed. 1971).
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id. § 3, at 15-16.
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aim most effectively and at the same time protect children to the greatest
extent possible, the best remedies not only should prevent recurrence of a
seller's disfavored conduct once it has been judicially disapproved but also
affirmatively encourage the seller to engage in desirable, non-manipulativd
conduc.t toward children buyers. These policies suggest the following pro-
posed remedies for breach of this fiduciary duty:
1. At the buyer's option, recission of all contracts for sale of products
that were induced by judicially disapproved advertising techniques.
2. General damages, perhaps the difference between the worth of the
product as acquired and what was paid for it in expectation of what was
represented in the promotion.
3. Special damages to compensate for inconvenience and nuisance119
in purchasing the seller's product.
4. Permanent injunctions restricting the use of harmful advertisements
or misleading marketing techniques." °
5. Court orders requiring the seller to finance counter-advertising to be
broadcast for a sufficient amount of time to offset the harmful effects of the
seller's manipulative advertisements. This is essentially the method used by
the FTC when it requires corrective advertising.' 2 ' A mere admission or
clarification of possible misrepresentation in former advertisements may not
eradicate the subliminal messages conveyed to children by powerful
psychological appeals, unless the corrective advertisements employ equally
effective techniques. Instead of being required only to correct former unfair
tactics, seller should be compelled to engage in educational counter-
advertising. These advertisements should convey information about the
positive and negative qualities of the seller's product or service and teach
children how to make rational consumer judgments. They should also en-
courage positive social standards of behavior. For example, a cereal com-
119. For a general discussion of nuisance, see W. PROSSER, TORTS, 571-612 (4th
ed. 1971).
120. The imposition of this duty would guard against unfair packaging and promo-
tion at the retail store, for instance.
121. The FTC has required corrective advertising in lieu of the traditional cease and
desist order, which merely eliminated the unfair advertisement, in an attempt to erase the
residual effects of deceptive or unfair advertisements on consumers. Comment, Corrective
Advertising: The FTC's New Formula For Effective Relief, 50 TEx. L. REV. 312 (1972).
The type of corrective advertising varies with the specific case. E.g., In re Warner-
Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975) (Warner-Lambert ordered to include in their ads the
statement that Listerine will not prevent colds or sore throats); In re Amstar Corp., 83
F.T.C. 659 (1973) (corrective advertisement disclaimed a prior representation that
Domino sugar gave a person strength); In re I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 79 F.T.C.
248 (1971) (Profile Bread agreed to devote twenty-five percent of one year of advertising
expenditures to correct possible misinterpretations of their prior advertisements).
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pany that advertises its high sugar content food as "nutritional" might be
required to run an advertisement presenting food groups and the body's need
for a balanced diet or statistics about the harmful effects of the average
American's eating habits. Similarly, a toy manufacturer might be required to
sponsor an advertisement showing children and parents the creative and
educational potential of homemade toys. Such advertisements would pro-
vide information in the public interest and are in harmony with the seller's
fiduciary duty.
6. Punitive damages 22 should also be awarded; perhaps the amount
should be equivalent to the seller's advertising budget for one year, but in
any case in a significant amount. This money could be used to establish a
governmental mechanism to oversee and review products and advertise-
ments for children. 2' The seller, under a protective order, should be re-
quired to submit to such a mechanism all research, psychological and mar-
keting tests, and studies that might shed light on the adverse effect of his
product or its advertisements on children.
7. General public directors should be permanently appointed to the
seller's board of directors.' 24 This is a broad remedy, not specifically tai-
lored to the violation of the fiduciary duty. However, courts may find a
mechanism within the corporate structure itself an appropriate means to
impose responsibility upon sellers and to insure that a child's best interests
will at least be considered as marketing decisions are made. These members,
representing the consumer public, would have the decision-making power of
a regular board member and the "watchdog" responsibility to investigate all
aspects of the company that might adversely affect children. The public
directors would also insure that the board consider consumer as well as
business interests before it makes vital policy decisions.
VI. Would the Courts Impose the Fiduciary Obligation?
There may be questions regarding, and objections to, the application of
such a fiduciary obligation. A response to these questions and objections
will illustrate the general benefits to be gained from such a doctrine. If
courts, rather than the Congress, or the executive through the FTC, are the
122. See Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal. App. 2d 225, 194 P.2d 533 (1948), allowing
recovery of punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty.-See also D. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 211-12 (1973).
123. E.g., United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., [1976] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH). 60,729 (Firestone ordered to produce corrective advertisements to be
submitted to the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the FTC for approval before their re-
lease).
124. See C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 152-53 (1975).
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first to impose the fiduciary duty discussed herein on sellers of children's
products, those sellers whose cases are among the first adjudicated might
object that they would be placed at a competitive disadvantage. However, it
is safe to assume that such a powerful industry would be quick to seek final
adjudication of the point by the highest court of the jurisdiction, since
millions of dollars could depend on the outcome. If the court saw fit to
impose the fiduciary duty, all sellers would be obligated to follow the same
high standard of care when dealing with children. Thus, the fiduciary doc-
trine would place all sellers on equal footing and facilitate ree competition.
Some people might object that existing legal doctrines afford children
adequate protection. In particular cases when sellers make recognizably
deceptive or misleading claims, the possibility of a suit for false and mis-
leading advertising based on a legal doctrine proper for the courts to enforce
may be a restraining influence. However, the harm perpetrated by a seller on
children is often subtle and the precise deception difficult to pinpoint. A
seller uses his refined knowledge to uncover precisely how children will
react to a certain set of stimuli and then develops promotional techniques
accordingly. He may, for example, sponsor a cereal commercial in which a
popular cartoon character tells children that his product has chocolate good-
ness in every bite and is the fun part of a balanced breakfast. This statement
probably would not, in the strict legal sense, be termed fraudulent or decep-
tive. Because children trust cartoon characters, however, and because sellers
are aware of this fact, the seller's use of this promotional technique can be
unfairly misleading and should be considered overreaching. Courts should
not be forced to stretch existing fraud doctrines to remedy this type of
inequitable situation when the fiduciary doctrine is peculiarly suited to pro-
tecting children from exploitive techniques. Courts recognizing this fact can
be expected to react favorably to a suitable case properly briefed and to
apply the fiduciary doctrine that confronts this problem directly.
Moreover, even if the child or his representative were to meet the
burden of proving fraud in advertising, the actual damages would be slight
relative to the seller's financial gain from the fraud. The annual rewards for
successful manipulation of the children's market are measured in millions of
dollars. Awarding actual damages would amount to no more than a financial
slap on the seller's wrist and would be unlikely to discourage his miscon-
duct.125 The fiduciary doctrine is especially appropriate here because it
differs from other legal remedies in its deterrent value. It mandates that the
seller not only must refrain from unfair techniques but also must employ
positive techniques for the child's best interest, because the fiduciary ad-
visor has an obligation actively to protect the relying party. Further, once
125. Id. at 30-34.
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courts recognize the existence of the fiduciary relation, the seller, not the
child, will have the burden of proof in any question of compliance with the
obligation.' 26
Wholesalers or retailers who distribute children's products, objecting
that the fiduciary doctrine is too comprehensive in scope, may urge the court
to apply it only to those responsible for creating and advertising children's
products. The comprehensive nature of the fiduciary doctrine, however, is
perhaps its largest value as protection. Market analysts and researchers,
distributors, and retail sellers of children's products-, as well as manufactur-
ers, advertisers, and broadcasting stations, have some control over the
promotional techniques, development, or distribution of-children's products
and a corresponding responsibility not to abuse this control. The pervasive
duty of care recommended can be analogized to that imposed by the doctrine
of strict products liability, in which all those engaged in the chain of dis-
tribution are held strictly liable for the product in order to give the consumer
the maximum protection:' 27 "Particularly today, when the large wholesale
supply house, or even the retail chain, is actually the prime mover in market-
ing the goods . . . it is unrealistic to draw any distinction between different
kinds of sellers. '"128 The courts should therefore have no problem holding
manufacturers and all accomplices in the marketing of "baited" products
for children liable for any damages. Only a comprehensive application of the
doctrine would insure that children receive the protection they need.
The fiduciary doctrine can be applied by the courts easily, and does not
require the establishment of a new agency to enforce it. Easy administration,
a broad scope of application, a general prohibition of subtle exploitive
techniques, and the clear imposition of an affirmative duty of care are all
special benefits of a judicially enforced fiduciary doctrine that do not exist in
any other legal remddy that can be used to protect children. Therefore, the
courts should be encouraged to apply this traditional principle to redress and
to prevent the exploitive treatment of children by the purveyors of children's
products.
VII. Constitutional Interests to be Furthered
by the Fiduciary Doctrine
Advertisers and broadcasters may claim to be exempt from the
fiduciary obligations on constitutional grounds, now that commercial speech
appears to be afforded full First Amendment protection.' 29 However, an
126. See G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 96, at 351 (5th ed. 1973).
127. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 100, at 665 (4th ed. 1971).
128. Id.
129. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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examination of the policies behind this recent extension of First Amendment
protection will show that they are harmonious with the fiduciary concept,
which in no way imposes a limitation or prior restraint on speech.
The theory of free speech is grounded on the belief that people will
make a well-reasoned choice if presented with all points of view on an
issue.13 Thus, although the First Amendment guarantees the freedom of
speech,"' certain types of speech such as libel,13 obscenity,' 33 and "fight-
ing words,"' 34 have not been afforded full First Amendment protection
because the harm they do outweighs their contribution to a free exchange of
ideas. Until this year, the "commercial speech doctrine" announced in
Valentine' v. Chrestensen"3 ' included advertising among the types of speech
deserving less than complete First Amendment protection. Cases subsequent
to Chrestensen evolved the "commercial speech doctrine" into a judicial
policy by which the courts determined the degree of protection to be granted
advertising by balancing the social importance of that speech against the
government interest in curtailing it. If the court determined that the advertis-
ing performed an additional function, such as editorializing'36 or promulgat-
ing religious ideas, 37 these competing interests almost invariably out-
weighed the state's interest in regulation. If the advertisement were purely
commercial and only conveyed product information, courts tipped the scales
in favor of governmental regulation of this speech as long as the regulation
was reasonable. 38 A concise statement of the policy justification for afford-
ing reduced protection to purely commercial speech was made inBanzhafv.
FCC:1
39
It is established that some utterances fall outside the pale of First
Amendment concern. Many cases indicate that product advertising is at
least less rigorously protected than other forms of speech. Promoting the
sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with any of the interests the
First Amendment seeks to protect. As a rule, it does not affect the
political process, does not contribute to the exchange of ideas, does not
130. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 881 (1963).
131. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
132. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
133. E.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
134. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
135. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
136. E.g., New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
137. E.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
138. E.g., Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973). See Note, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Expression, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 761 (1976).
139. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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provide information on matters of public importance, and is not, except
perhaps for the ad-men, a form of individual self-expression. It is rather a
form of merchandising subject to limitation for public purposes like other
business practices.140
Measured against the standard of the old "commercial speech doctrine" as
stated in Banzhaf, the fiduciary doctrine as applied to the seller-child rela-
tionship would clearly withstand a constitutional challenge. The speech
regulated would be purely commercial, and the government interest in the
regulation for the protection of children is reasonable."'
However, the fiduciary doctrine must also be examined in light of
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,"' in which the Supreme Court questioned the commercial speech
distinction and appeared to extend full First Amendment protection to purely
commercial speech. The Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that
prohibited the advertising of prescription drug price information, reasoning
that the advertiser's economic interest in that speech did not remove it from
the sphere of First Amendment protection.143 The Court also considered
commercial speech worthy of constitutional protection, in light of the con-
sumer's First Amendment right to receive commercial information he can
use to make enlightened consumer judgments:'
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that
those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well-informed. To
this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. 45
Extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech implies that
any regulation of this speech will now have to withstand the careful balanc-
ing test used previously when the advertising performed an additional func-
tion. "'46 Thus, in Virginia Citizens, when the consumers' right to know and
pharmacists' right to disseminate information were balanced against the
state's public health interest in protecting the professionalism of its licensed
pharmacists, the Court held that the ban on advertising could not stand
because there were less restrictive means for the state to achieve its goal. 4 '
After adjudicating the particular fact situation presented, the Court
went on to list certain general types of commercial speech regulation that
140. Id. at 1101-02.
141. See text accompanying notes 80-91 supra.
142. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
143. Id. at 762.
144. Id. at 765.
145. Id.
146. See text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
147. 425 U.S. at 770.
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would prevail in the balancing process, because of some additional factor
inherent in the speech sought to be regulated. Two of these categories are
relevant to this discussion. The Court stated that deceptive and misleading
advertising makes no valid contribution to a consumer's decisionmaking
process and can properly be regulated. " 8 The Court also noted that its
decision did not deal with the electronic broadcasting media,'49 implying
that governmental regulation of commercial speech broadcast over radio and
television could be sustained in order to promote a reasonable government
health or welfare interest. 150
A fiduciary relationship as here conceived between sellers (including
broadcasters and advertisers) and their audience would not chill the First
Amendment rights of the former even under Virginia Citizens. The seller's
duties of fully and fairly disclosing all detriments in the product or service
and of using non-manipulative advertising messages are meant to insure that
children are exposed only to trustworthy, non-deceptive advertising from
which to make an enlightened consumer decision. The application of the
fiduciary doctrine furthers the consumer's right to know and is therefore in
harmony with the policy justification the Court announced for extending
First Amendment protection to commercial speech. When the interests of
the children in receiving truthful product information and the state's interest
in protecting children are balanced against the seller's right to disseminate
advertisements without restriction, the Court would be likely to tip the scales
in favor of the regulation. Moreover, because the fiduciary doctrine would
only prevent unfair, exploitive speech, it could be sustained in light of the
Court's affirmation of the regulations imposed on false advertising. The
added fact that most advertising aimed at children is broadcast over the
electronic media would also make that speech more susceptible to regula-
tion.
As noted earlier, more far-reaching solutions to this exploitation than
the application of a fiduciary relationship--such as banning advertising from
children's television programs-have already been proposed.' Given both
the strong state interest in protecting children against harm of any sort and
the Supreme Court's indication that regulations of commercial speech over
the electronic media will be more readily sustained than other advertising,
this solution may not be unreasonable. Therefore, the constitutionality of a
148. Id. at 771.
149. Id. at 773.
150. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (1968). cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969).
151. See text accompanying note 33 supra. See generally J. Mander, Suburbaniza-
tion of the Mind: Why We Should Eliminate Television and Howv To Do It (1975) (draft
outline for a proposal to ban television altogether).
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more conservative, less restrictive method of protecting children from com-
mercial exploitation, application of the fiduciary doctrine, should be readily
sustained by the courts.
Conclusion
Today, as never before, sellers of children's products are reaching out
to exploit young, trusting children. The inequity of this relationship has been
recognized by society, and fragmented attempts have been made to rectify
the problem. However, piecemeal regulations, largely relying for their en-
forcement on a seller's voluntary compliance, have not proven to be an
effective restraint. Sellers in a free enterprise society are understandably
more motivated by their desire for profit than by an obligation to serve the
public interest, and they show no signs of significantly altering their market-
ing practices without some legal mandate to do so. The law, which has
traditionally afforded children special legal protection, can be effectively
employed to protect children from the inequitable treatment they are ex-
periencing at the hands of purveyors of children's products by recognizing a
fiduciary relationship between sellers and children. Based on the firm public
policy that shields children, this fiduciary doctrine would require that the
seller deal with children with the utmost care and with their best interest
affirmatively in mind. Extensive remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty
would insure faithful compliance.
In 2250 B.C., the Code of Hammurabi made commercial dealing with
a child without a contract or witnesses a crime punishable by death.15
Surely, our advanced society would not allow salespeople in a home for the
mentally retarded or psychologically ill. At the least, society can legally
identify the fiduciary relationship that exists between the seller and the
vulnerable child. A sophisticated seller could easily be educated about his
obligations under the fiduciary doctrine. Is it, then, too much to ask that he
not abuse a child's wonderland?
Anon, to sudden silence won,
In fancy they pursue
The dream-child moving through a land
Of wonders wild and new,
In friendly chat with bird or beast-
And half believe it's true.
Thus grew the tale of Wonderland,
Thus slowly, one by one,
Its quaint events were hammered out-
And now the tale is done.153
152. G. DRIVER & J. MILES, BABYLONIAN LAWS 15 (1955).
153. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1946) (introduc-
tory poem).

